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ARTICLE
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS
UNDER THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT:
A PRIMER AND A CRITIQUE
Valerie Watnick ∗
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of scandals involving Enron, Arthur Andersen and
other corporations, Congress enacted the landmark Corporate and
Criminal Fraud Accountability Act, more famously known as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereinafter the “Act” or “Sarbanes-Oxley”). 1
Sarbanes-Oxley provided for sweeping reforms in the way that publicly
held corporations account for and make public disclosures under federal
securities laws. 2 President George W. Bush signed the bill into law and
∗ Associate Professor of Law, City University of New York, Baruch College,
Zicklin School of Business. This Article is dedicated to my husband.
1. Pub. L. No. 107-204 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29
U.S.C.A.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley].
2. See id. Sarbanes-Oxley created a new federal agency, the Public Accounting
Oversight Board, which altered the way accounting and consulting firms are permitted
to practice, altered corporate governance practices (by requiring that all public
companies have independent audit committees) and imposed broader and more severe
criminal penalties for accounting and securities fraud. Numerous articles and
commentaries have already been written about Sarbanes-Oxley, but the Author believes
this to be the first law review Article compiling an extensive history of whistleblower
decisions under the Act. See, e.g., Jennifer Wheeler, Securities Law: Section 307 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Irreconcilable Conflict with the ABA’s Model Rules and the
Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct?, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 461 (2003); Gary G.
Grindler & Jason A. Jones, Please Step Away from the Shredder and the ‘Delete’ Key:
§§ 802 and 1102 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67 (2004); Miriam
A. Cherry, Whistling the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers and the Implications
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029 (2004);
Robert C. Brighton, Jr., Sarbanes-Oxley: A Primer for Public Companies, and Their
Officers and Directors, and Audit Firms, 28 VILL. L. REV. 605 (2004); Samantha
Ahuja, What Do I Do Now? A Lawyer’s Duty Post-Sarbanes-Oxley, 38 VAL. U. L. REV.
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touted the Act as a “far-reaching” reform of American business
practices. 3 In attempting to reform American business practices,
Congress pressed corporate officers, directors, and other employees into
service, enlisting them as “foot soldiers” in the fight against corporate
fraud. Congress did so by requiring those who witness corporate fraud
to report what they know about it 4 and by offering commiserate
protection from retaliation under the “whistleblower protection”
provisions contained within Sarbanes-Oxley. 5 Yet, despite SarbanesOxley being touted as a new bulwark against corporate fraud, the courts
continue to weaken these whistleblower provisions 6 and newspapers
continue to report scandals involving corporate fraud. 7 It seems that
those who might blow the whistle and protect corporate shareholders are
not coming forward soon enough to prevent corporate fraud 8 and
whistleblower protections have not accomplished their intended purpose.
The question then is: are the administrative procedures and legal
standards inherent in Sarbanes-Oxley such that the whistleblower
protections are more illusory than functional?
This Article sets out to answer this question, critically examining
the whistleblower protections afforded employees under SarbanesOxley. Part I of the Article considers the statutory language, the
1263 (2004); Lauren C. Cohen, Note, In-House Counsel and the Attorney-Client
Privilege: How Sarbanes-Oxley Misses the Point, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 297 (2004);
Leonard M. Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow?: An Analysis of Corporate Whistleblowers,
the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 875 (2002) (published in the aftermath of the Enron scandal and in the same year
as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
3. President George W. Bush, Remarks at Signing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 38 WKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 31, 1283 (Jul. 30, 2002).
4. See Sarbanes-Oxley.
5. See id. Congress also requires companies to set up procedures for receiving
and retaining reports of such fraud. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78j-1 (West Supp. 2003).
6. Lynne Bernabei & Jason Zuckerman, Protect the Whistleblower, NAT’L LAW
J., (Jun. 19, 2006).
7. See, e.g., Reni Gertner, Litigation Over Option Backdating Increases, ST.
LOUIS DAILY RECORD, Sept. 2, 2006.
8. Sarbanes-Oxley specifies that whistleblower complaints are supposed to be
confidential and anonymous, and that companies are supposed to set up procedures for
the treatment of these complaints. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 301. Because such procedures
are not specified in the Act, treatment can mean something insignificant such as filing
and reviewing. See Cherry, supra note 2, at 1071-72.
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legislative history, and the regulations pursuant to the Act. Part II then
examines recent decisions by the U.S. Department of Labor in SarbanesOxley whistleblower cases (cases under the Act are initially adjudicated
by the Department of Labor) 9 and the overall framework for
implementation of the law. The manner in which Sarbanes-Oxley
relates to state law, particularly the doctrine of at-will employment, is
discussed in Part III. Part IV considers the breadth and effectiveness of
the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protections and the existing legal and
corporate cultural framework. Finally, Part V proposes suggestions for
improving current whistleblower protections under Sarbanes-Oxley so
that they will accomplish their intended legislative purposes.
This article concludes that rulings on Sarbanes-Oxley complaints,
and the implementation of existing regulations adopted by the
Department of Labor to date, are evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower protections are not nearly strong enough to protect
whistleblowing employees, and to bring about the changes envisioned
by Congress. 10 Rather, the existing legal framework imposes undue
waiting periods on whistleblowers, and does not compel corporations to
root out fraud. 11 Moreover, in May 2006, the already anemic framework
suffered another blow in the Second Circuit. 12 In Bechtel v. Competitive
Technologies, the Circuit Court questioned the viability of all-important
Sarbanes-Oxley provisions that call for immediate reinstatement of a
whistleblowing employee who establishes “reasonable cause” 13 before a
hearing that his termination was in retaliation for his whistleblowing.14
This decision, holding the reinstatement remedy under Sarbanes-Oxley
unenforceable in a federal court, strikes a deadly blow to whistleblowing
employees and the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provisions

9.
10.
11.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b) (2002).
See infra notes 54-58, 180-202 and accompanying text.
Indeed, at least one article, partially written to reassure corporation counsels,
noted that “the avalanche” of whistleblower claims that some predicted has not come to
fruition. See Grotta Glassman, Sarbanes Oxley Whistleblower Protection—Two Years
Later—What Hath Enron Wrought?, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, Feb. 2005 N.E. Ed., p.
23.
12. Bechtel v. Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d 469 (2d Cir. 2006).
13. Id. at 472-73; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (b)(2) (adopting 49 U.S.C.
§ 42121(b) (2000)).
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (b)(2) (adopting 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)). See also
Bechtel, 448 F.3d at 472-74.
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generally. 15 What Bechtel makes abundantly clear is that as the Act is
being implemented, the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provisions will
not protect and encourage corporate whistleblowers. 16
Normatively, it appears that meaningful changes must occur on
three levels to protect and encourage whistleblowers to “whistle” early
on and to thereby prevent corporate fraud: (i) there must be more
exacting implementation of the existing Sarbanes-Oxley regulations; (ii)
administrative tribunals and courts must give effect to the intent of the
statute—to actually protect whistleblowers; and (iii) years after the
“Enron wake-up call,” public companies must still reform their business
cultures to encourage the free flow of information and reporting of
wrongdoing.
Whistleblower protection is a critical part of both Sarbanes-Oxley
and fraud prevention. 17 Loyal employees with information to report
about their corporate employer will only come forward readily—to
protect investors and individual shareholders against corporate fraud—
when they believe that their livelihoods will be protected in an
immediate and real way. Only when all employees are watching—and
no one is afraid to blow the whistle—will the incidence of fraud in
public corporations drop to an acceptable level.

15. See Bechtel, 448 F.3d at 473-75; see also infra notes 144-45, 147 and
accompanying text. This decision holding the reinstatement remedy potentially
unenforceable seems to be in line with current judicial thinking. On May 30, 2006, the
United States Supreme Court held that a public employee claiming retaliation for
speaking against an employer decision had not engaged in protected speech sufficient to
claim retaliation for the communications he had made. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, No.
04-473 (U.S. May 30, 2006). While Garcetti was not a Sarbanes–Oxley whistleblower
case, it does not bode well for future whistleblowers that will come before this Court.
16. See, e.g., Bechtel, 448 F.3d at 473-74; Bernabei & Zuckerman, supra note 6, at
1; infra notes 180-202 and accompanying text.
17. See 148 Cong. Rec., S. 7418-21 (daily ed. Jul. 26, 2002); infra notes 54-58 and
accompanying text.
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I. THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
A. Overview
The whistleblower protections in Sarbanes-Oxley 18 provide in
§ 806 19 in pertinent part: 20
§ 1514A. Civil action to protect against retaliation in fraud cases.
(a) Whistleblower Protection For Employees of Publicly Traded
Companies. No company with a class of securities registered
under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. 78l), or that is required to file reports under section
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78o(d)), or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or
agent of such company, may discharge, demote, suspend,
threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against
an employee in the terms and conditions of employment
because of any lawful act done by the employee—
(1) to provide information, cause information to be provided,
or otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any
conduct which the employee reasonably believes
constitutes a violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or
1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to
fraud against shareholders, when the information or
assistance is provided to or the investigation is conducted
by—
(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency;
(B) any Member of Congress or any committee of
Congress; or
(C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee
(or such other person working for the employer who has
the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate
misconduct); or
(2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise
assist in a proceeding filed or about to be filed (with any
knowledge of the employer) relating to an alleged violation
18.
19.
20.

See Sarbanes-Oxley; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2002).
Sarbanes-Oxley requires publicly traded companies to convene standing audit
committees composed of independent directors and at least one financial expert. These
committees have the power to hire, compensate and fire the corporation’s auditors.
These committees are also charged with establishing procedures for handling
whistleblower complaints. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 301.
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of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any
provision of Federal law relating to fraud against
shareholders.

Sarbanes-Oxley thus provides redress to an employee wronged
under the Act in that an employee may bring an enforcement action by
filing a complaint with the Department of Labor within 90 days of the
alleged wrongful action 21 by the employer. 22 The employee, if
successful, is entitled to such relief as is necessary to make him whole,
including back pay, reinstatement, 23 and compensatory damages. 24
While the statute initially provided specifically that any action for relief
21. What constitutes “wrongful” action for purposes of the Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower provisions is discussed below. See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying
text.
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b). The Department of Labor has at times broadly
construed the Act to meet its remedial purpose, allowing in appropriate cases the
equitable tolling of the 90-day period that a complainant has to file his claim for relief.
See Lerbs v. Buca di Beppo, Inc., 2003 DOLSOX LEXIS 29, *7-9 (Dec. 30, 2003). On
the other hand, the Department of Labor has at times strictly construed Sarbanes-Oxley,
requiring that the “named person” (the employer) be a “publicly traded company”
within the meaning of the statute, and disallowing a claim where the respondent
employer had initially filed a registration statement, but had not later been required to
file public financial reports pursuant to federal securities laws. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(b); Flake v. New World Pasta Co., 2003 DOLSOX LEXIS 38, *13 (July 7,
2003) (holding that respondent employer was not a “publicly traded company” within
Sarbanes-Oxley since it had not filed certain public financial reports). Likewise, the
Department of Labor has consistently held that Sarbanes-Oxley will not be retroactively
applied where the “protected activity” and “adverse employment action” were taken
prior to the effective date of Sarbanes-Oxley. See Gilmore v. Parametric Tech., 2003
DOLSOX LEXIS 51, *12-14 (Feb. 6, 2003); Greenwald v. UBS Paine Webber, Inc.,
2003 DOLSOX LEXIS 50, *1 (Apr. 17, 2003). Sarbanes-Oxley is still relatively new,
and it remains to be seen how the Department of Labor will treat whistleblowers in the
long-term. A definite trend, however, can already be observed in the Department’s
“defense-leaning tendency.” See infra notes 180-202 and accompanying text.
23. At least two distinct courts have held that damages under the Act might include
“reputational” damages sufficient to make the employee whole. See Hanna v. W.L.I.
Communities, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 34 (S.D. Fla. 2004), Mahony v. Keyspan Corp
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22042 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). But see infra notes 144-45, 147 and
accompanying text.
Reinstatement might include economic reinstatement, or
reinstatement to the complainant’s actual job depending on the circumstances of the
case. See Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,104-08.
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c).
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would be governed by the burdens of proof previously applicable to the
Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st
Century (“AIR 21”) 25 and initially adopted the rules and procedures
from AIR 21, 26 the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in
December 2004 issued final rules and procedures for the specific
handling of discrimination complaints under Sarbanes-Oxley. 27
B. Procedural Framework for Whistleblower Proceedings
Under Sarbanes-Oxley
The rules and procedures detail the handling of a Sarbanes-Oxley
complaint from inception to hearing and appeal. 28 From the outset, the
statute itself calls for an investigation, a preliminary order of
reinstatement 29 if there is a “reasonable cause” to believe the complaint
has merit, and a hearing if requested by either party.30
The procedures further provide that a “[c]omplaint will be
dismissed if it fails to make a prima facie showing that protected
behavior or conduct was a contributing factor in the unfavorable
personnel action alleged in the complaint.” 31
The initial procedures only require a complainant to raise an
inference that his protected conduct was a contributing factor in the
25.
26.

49 U.S.C. § 42121(b) (2000).
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b). The procedures and burden of proof made expressly
applicable to a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower complaint originate in 49 U.S.C.
§ 42121(b).
27. Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under Section 806
of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 29 C.F.R. § 1980.100 (2004). Since these procedures and
the language of Sarbanes-Oxley are similar to those found in AIR 21 (Wendell H. Ford
Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b) (“AIR
21”)), the ERA (The Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(3)(D) (“ERA”)),
and the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (“STAA”) and because cases under
Sarbanes-Oxley are still limited, cases under AIR 21, STAA, and the ERA are
discussed in this article where applicable. See Halloum v. Intel Corp., Case No. 2003SOX-0007, at 10 (Mar. 4, 2004) (noting that the implementing regulations for SarbanesOxley are patterned after the ERA, the STAA, and AIR 21); see also supra notes 25-26
and accompanying text.
28. See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.100.
29. See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying discussion.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2) (adopting 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)).
31. 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,104, 52,106.
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employer’s decision. 32 If he does this, then an investigation of the claim
will proceed unless the employer can show by clear and convincing
evidence that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
terminating the complainant. 33 Since the Sarbanes-Oxley administrative
procedure was designed to be an expedited proceeding, 34 the rules state
that a Respondent has 20 days from receipt of the complaint to meet
with OSHA and present evidence in support of its position. 35 The
procedures do not provide for the OSHA investigator to share this
evidence with the complainant. 36 If the OSHA investigator has
“reasonable cause” to believe that the “named person [the respondent
employer] has violated the Act and therefore that preliminary relief for
the complainant is warranted, OSHA again contacts the named person
with notice of this determination.” 37 The rules then require that the
named person be given ten business days to provide written evidence,
meet with the investigator and provide legal and factual arguments
against a preliminary award of relief. 38 Again, the procedures do not
give the complainant a commensurate right to meet with the OSHA
investigator or to provide written evidence arguing in favor of a
preliminary award for relief. 39
32. Id. In typical discrimination cases, an inference of discrimination is shown by
offering evidence that the employer treated the complainant in a disparate manner. See
Adams v. Zucker Ent., Inc., 2005 WL 1397551 (2005).
33. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,106. (outlining that once the complaint is filed, the
Assistant Secretary must notify the Respondent, also known as the “named person”);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a).
34. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,107.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 52,106-07.
37. Id. at 52,107.
38. See id. This Section of the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations was designed to
provide due process protection to the Respondent in accord with the United States
Supreme Court’s decision under the whistleblower provisions of the STAA. See Brock
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252 (1987). While this section may also provide
due process to the complainant who may not be in danger of suffering direct deprivation
of property at the hands of the government, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261
(1970), this Section certainly tips the balance in favor of the employer by allowing only
the respondent to submit written evidence and to at least a rudimentary hearing with the
investigator prior to a preliminary determination. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267. As is
discussed later in this article, lengthening the procedure will favor the employer in most
instances. See infra notes 39, 203-08, 269-78 and accompanying text.
39. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,106-07. Prior to their finalization, the “Government
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Within 60 days of the filing of the complaint, the investigator is to
make a determination on behalf of the Assistant Secretary that either
preliminary relief is warranted, or the complaint lacks merit. 40 If the
Assistant Secretary determines that preliminary relief is warranted, he
may order that the employee be reinstated. 41 Either party may file
objections to the preliminary determination of the Assistant Secretary
within 30 days of receipt of the investigator’s findings and request a
hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). 42
At the hearing on the objections to the preliminary determination of
the Assistant Secretary, an employee bringing a Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower claim must ultimately show by a preponderance of the
evidence 43 that: (1) he engaged in protected activity under SarbanesOxley; (2) that the employer was aware of the protected activity; (3) that
he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the protected
activity was likely a contributing factor in the employer’s decision to
take adverse action. 44 Since there is seldom direct evidence of

Accountability Project” argued that the implementing rules for Sarbanes-Oxley were
biased in favor of the employer. See id. at 52,107.
40. 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,108. The Assistant Secretary has not made consistently a
determination within the 60-day deadline. See infra note 48 and accompanying text; 69
Fed.Reg. at 52,108.
41. The validity and enforceability of an investigator’s order of reinstatement have
been called into question by the Second Circuit’s May 2006 decision in Bechtel. See
Bechtel, 448 F.3d at 472-75; see also infra notes 144-45, 147 and accompanying text.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A((b)(2) (adopting 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)); 69 Fed. Reg. at
52,108.
43. The United States Supreme Court’s McDonnell Douglas burden shifting
analysis closely parallels the AIR 21 test for determining whether a whistleblower
under Sarbanes-Oxley can initially make out a prima facie case. See infra notes 59-65
and accompanying text. See also Halloum v. Intel Corp., Case No. 2003-SOX-7, at 910 (ALJ March 4, 2004), aff’d ARB Case No. 04-068 (ALJ Jan. 31, 2006) (discussing
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (applying a burden shifting
analysis to discrimination complaints under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)).
The analysis is instructive on the ultimate question as to whether a complainant can
prove illegal retaliatory action. See Halloum, 2003-SOX-7 at 9; infra notes 59 to 65
and accompanying text.
44. See Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., Case No. 2003-SOX-15, at 34 (ALJ
Jan. 28, 2004) (citing Macktal v. Dep’t of Labor, 171 F.3d 1137 (8th Cir. 1993)); Zinn
v. Univ. of Mo., 1993–ERA–34 (Sec’y Jan. 18, 1996). Each of the elements of a
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claim is discussed in detail in this article. See infra
notes 67-124 and accompanying text.
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discrimination against a whistleblower, whistleblowing employees may
prove a nexus between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action inferentially. 45
After a hearing, the ALJ will issue a decision in the matter and that
decision will become the final decision of the Secretary of Labor unless
a timely petition for review is filed with the Administrative Review
Board (“ARB”). 46 Sarbanes-Oxley further provides that if the Secretary
of Labor has not issued a final decision within 180 days of the initial
filing by the employee, the employee may bring an appropriate action
for de novo review and appropriate relief in federal court. 47
The catch in all of these carefully crafted procedures is that they are
not being closely followed. 48 Most Sarbanes-Oxley cases are lingering
45. See Woodman v. WWOR TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 83 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that
direct evidence of discrimination is not required in an age discrimination case under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that discrimination can be shown with
circumstantial evidence); Richards v. Lenmark Int’l Inc., Case No. 2004-SOX-00049, at
13; Getman v. SW. Sec., Inc., Case No. 2003-SOX-0008 at 15 (ALJ Feb. 2, 2004)
(seldom direct evidence of intent), rev’d on other grounds, ARB 04-059 (ARB July 29,
2005); see infra notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
46. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,111.
47. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b); 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,111. The complainant can bring
an action in federal court for de novo review of his complaint if there is no showing that
the Secretary’s failure to issue a final decision is not due to the bad faith of the
complainant. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b). In Murray v. TXU Corp., the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Texas held that while failing to comply with procedures in
the C.F.R. and “not holding the Secretary’s feet to the irons” might delay a decision,
such falls “far short” of showing that the plaintiff acted in bad faith. See Murray v.
TXU Corp., 279 F. Supp. 2d 799, 804 (N.D. Tex. 2003). In Murray, the court was
willing to hear complainant’s case de novo. See Murray, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 804.
Additionally, the right to file in federal court is not absolute, even if the complainant
has acted in good faith. A federal court may refuse to hear a whistleblower case on a de
novo basis if it would not be an efficient use of resources to do so. In other words, if
the Department of Labor has expanded significant resources on a matter and appears
close to making a decision, a federal court can exercise its discretionary right to refuse
to take the matter into its jurisdiction. Finally, the District Court may take judicial
notice of the administrative record in a Sarbanes-Oxley proceeding that has been
removed to its jurisdiction. See McClendon v. Hewlett-Packard Co., WL 2847224 (D.
Idaho 2005) (noting administrative proceeding in McClendon v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
2005-SOX-3 (ALJ)).
48. See Office of Administrative Law Judges, U.S Dep’t of Labor, available at
http://www.oalj.dol.gov (last visited Apr. 24, 2007) (cataloguing and digesting cases by
date). See, e.g., McIntyre v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., ARB 2003-SOX-23, (ARB Jul. 27,
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longer then the mandated 180 days. 49 While these dispute processes
overall may not be inordinately long in the context of the U.S. judicial
and administrative dispute resolution systems, they are too long to
achieve Congress’s goal of protecting whistleblowing workers and
preventing corporations from retaliating against them. Indeed, the
ordinary employee cannot afford a long period without a paycheck. 50 If
losing his livelihood without appropriate protection is to be the
consequence of his “whistleblowing,” the employee will simply choose
not to report what he reasonably perceives as violations of federal
securities laws. 51 If he does report, a prolonged waiting period will in
turn encourage corporations, who know that there is no reason to expect
a prompt administrative response to adverse action against
whistleblowers, to gloss over or cover up their wrongdoing, instead of
correcting it. If the legislative thinking behind an expedited proceeding
was to encourage and protect whistleblowers that find themselves out of
work, and to compel companies to take their complaints seriously—and
it surely was 52 —such planning is not coming to fruition when
proceedings to correct retaliation against whistleblowers take a year or
more to resolve. 53
C. The Legislative History and Intent of Sarbanes-Oxley
In a Section-by-Section analysis of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the
Senate indeed reported that the purpose of the whistleblower protection
contained in Section 806 was to provide federal protection to employees
that report evidence of fraud to supervisors or federal officials. 54 The
2005) (Final Decision & Order filed); Willy v. Ameriton Props., Inc., Case No. 2003SOX-9 (Jun. 27, 2003) (discussing steps taken in the proceedings); Halloum v. Intel
Corp., 2003-SOX-7 (ARB Jan. 31, 2006) (Final decision and order approximately three
years after initial complaint); Getman v. Sw. Sec., Inc., ARB 2003-SOX-8 (ARB Jul.
29, 2005) (Final Decision & Order approximately two years after initial complaint).
49. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
50. Brock v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1987) (noting that the
eventual potential recovery of backpay may not be enough incentive to encourage
reporting of violations).
51. See id.
52. See Bechtel v. Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d at 484-85 (Straub, J.,
dissenting); see also infra notes 54-58, 145-48 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
54. See 148 Cong. Rec., S. 7418-21; 18 U.S.C. § 1514(A) (2002).
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protections were intended to ensure that companies take such complaints
seriously and avoid the temptation to sweep them under the boardroom
rugs.
The Senate noted that prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, employees reporting
fraud had to rely on the “vagaries” of state law for protection. 55 The
Senate further noted that most corporate employers knew exactly what
they could do within state law to avoid a suit by a whistleblowing
employee. 56 The Senate’s report also states that U.S. laws need to
encourage and protect those who report fraudulent activity that can
“damage innocent investors in publicly traded companies.” 57 The
whistleblower provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley were thus touted as the
“single most effective measure possible to prevent recurrence of the
Enron debacle and similar threats to the nation’s financial markets.” 58
II. WHISTLEBLOWER CASES DECIDED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
AND FEDERAL COURTS
A. Introduction
At a hearing on the merits of a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower
claim, an administrative law judge will employ a burden shifting
55. See 148 Cong. Rec., S. 7418-21. For example, New York’s whistleblower law
only protects employees that report an actual violation of a law or regulation and only if
the violation creates a specific danger to the public health or safety. See N.Y. LAB.
LAW
§ 740 (1984). Indeed, in New York, an employee who reports corporate fraud has no
state law protection against retaliation. See Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 88 N.Y.2d 869,
871; see also Sandra Mullings, Is There Whistleblower Protection of Private Employees
in New York?, 69 Feb. N.Y. ST. B.J. 36, 37 (1997) (noting that as of 1997, only 16 states
had whistleblower statutes, only ten of those protected employees when they had a
reasonable belief that a statute or rule had been violated and that in the other six states,
whistleblowing employees have to show that they have reported an actual violation of
state law or regulation).
56. See 148 Cong. Rec., S. 7418-21. Anecdotally, it has been reported that within
48 hours of Sherron Watkins of Enron writing her whistleblowing memo to Ken Lay,
the Chairman of Enron was given a memo that indicated Ms. Watkins could be fired
and that she was not protected under state law. See ROBERT PRENTICE, STUDENT GUIDE
TO THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 53 (Thomson-West 2005).
57. See 148 Cong. Rec., S. 7418-21.
58. Id.
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analysis that is similar to, but not exactly like, the burden shifting
analysis laid down by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas v. Green. 59 In a hearing, the whistleblower must first prove
each of the elements of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.60
If he meets this burden, the employer may still defend by proving with
clear and convincing evidence that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive for its personnel action, and it would have taken
the same action even if complainant had not engaged in the protected
activity. 61 Even if the Respondent meets this burden, the complainant
can still ultimately prevail at a hearing if he can then show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s stated legitimate

59. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); infra notes 6065 and accompanying text. In McDonnell Douglas, the United States Supreme Court
held that a discrimination plaintiff in a Title VII discrimination case would bear the
initial burden to prove the elements of his prima facie case by a preponderance of the
evidence. See id. at 802. If he were able to meet this burden, the burden would then
shift to the employer to articulate a legitimate reason for its actions. See Halloum v.
Intel Corp., 2003-SOX-0007 at 10. If the employer could succeed in this relatively low
burden, the employee could then still succeed if he could prove that the employer’s
reason was a mere pretext. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807; Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (noting that employer in a
discrimination case has mere burden to produce, not persuade as to its legitimate
reasons for acting). These burdens are different in Sarbanes-Oxley wherein an
employer is required to prove (rather than articulate or produce under McDonnell
Douglas) by clear and convincing evidence a legitimate reason for its adverse action
against an employee. See Halloum, Case No. 2003-SOX-0007 at 10; McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
60. See Halloum, Case No. 2003-SOX-0007 at 10.
A Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower claim is heard at trial de novo. At a hearing, there is no need to decide
whether the complainant has made out a prima facie case as this finding is related to
procedural dismissal at the investigative stage of a proceeding. Id. The Halloum court
noted that while the McDonnell Douglas model of analysis was not exactly the same as
the required analysis under Sarbanes-Oxley, the “McDonnell Douglas model
nonetheless serves as an analytical tool to help determine the ultimate issue of whether
Complainant suffered forbidden discrimination.” Id.; see supra notes 58-59 and
accompanying text.
61. See Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., Case No. 2003-SOX-15 at 37. The
courts have recognized that the “clear and convincing evidence” standard is higher than
a preponderance of the evidence, but lower than beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing
Yule v. Burns Int’l Security Serv., Case No. 1993-ERA-12 (Sec’y May 24, 1995);
Halloum, Case No. 2003-SOX-0007 at 10; see supra note 126, 128-30 (describing the
clear and convincing evidence standard to be applied in Sarbanes-Oxley cases).
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reason is not the real reason, but a “pretext” for the discriminatory
action. 62 A complainant can show pretext by showing that the
Respondent lacks credibility 63 or that the protected activity influenced
the employer to take adverse action against the employee. 64 The
complainant bears the ultimate burden of showing that his protected
activity contributed to the employer’s decision to take adverse action
against him. 65 Each of the elements of the claim and the defenses are
discussed below with citations to representative cases. 66
B. Protected Activity
A “whistleblowing” employee 67 must first establish that he has
engaged in “protected activity.” 68 Within the remedial nature of the
statute, “protected activity” is broadly defined to include the reporting of
information to Congress, any investigative agency of the federal
government, or a supervisor at the employer itself; that the employee
reasonably believes relates to federal securities, mail, wire or other
fraud, a violation of Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rules

62. See Getman v. Sw. Sec., Inc., Case No. 2003-SOX-000008 at 18-19, rev’d on
other grounds, ARB 04-059 (ARB July 29, 2005).
63. Id.
64. See infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
65. See Halloum, Case No. 2003-SOX-0007 at 10.
66. See infra notes 67-147 and accompanying text.
67. As a threshold question, a person making a claim under Sarbanes-Oxley must
generally show that he is an employee of a publicly traded company. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A. In a landmark decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit has held that a person is not an “employee” of a publicly traded company within
the Act if he is foreign worker employed by an overseas subsidiary of a publicly traded
U.S. company. See Carnero v. Boston Sci. Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2006);
Beck v. Citicorp., Inc., Case No. 2006-SOX-00003 (August 1, 2006) (holding that the
court lacked jurisdiction where the complainant was employed in Germany when the
adverse action took place).
68. See Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., Case No. 2003-SOX-15 at 34 (citing
Macktal v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 171 F.3d 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). In Welch, the ALJ
issued a recommended decision and order after a hearing, ordering reinstatement. Id. at
34. This order has yet to be enforced. As of June 9, 2006, however, the Administrative
Review Board held that the order of reinstatement should not be stayed (as requested by
the employer) and that reinstatement should proceed, but that it could include economic
reinstatement. Id. It has been more than two years since the ALJ’s decision in Welch
and complainant still had not had any relief as of June 2006. Id.
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or any other fraud against the shareholders. 69 The courts and the
administrative tribunals within the U.S. Department of Labor 70 have
held that it is not necessary that the information reported actually
amount to a crime, 71 but only that the suspect actions have been
committed and are reasonably believed by the reporting person to be a
criminal fraud or other violation of federal securities law. 72
In Collins v. Beazer, plaintiff brought her case in federal district
court 73 under Sarbanes-Oxley based on her “reasonable belief” that a
violation of federal securities laws or regulations had occurred.74
Plaintiff, a director of marketing at a public company, Beazer Homes
USA, Inc., reported that the division in which she worked: was
knowingly overpaying and engaging in business with an outside person
because of a personal relationship between management and the outside
person; that a manager was overpaying sales agents who were the
manager’s personal friends; and that “kickbacks” were being paid for
lumber purchases. 75
The court noted that the plaintiff was not required to show an
“actual violation” of federal securities law, but only that she
‘‘reasonably believed” that there was a violation of one of the federal
laws or regulations enumerated in Sarbanes-Oxley. 76 The court noted
69.
70.

18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
See Barnes v. Raymond James Assocs., Case No. 2004-SOX-58 (ALJ January
10, 2005) (complainant did not prove her reasonable belief that information reported
constituted violation of law).
71. In Getman, the ARB reversed the ALJ’s holding and held that complainant
Getman, a financial analyst at Southwest, had not engaged in “protected activity” when
she publicly refused to change a stock rating. See Getman v. Sw. Sec., Inc., ARB Case
No. 04-059 (ALJ Feb. 2, 2004) (rev’g Case No. 2003-SOX-00008).
72. See Collins v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1376 (N.D. Ga.
2004) (citing Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 992
F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1993)); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1).
73. Plaintiff Collins first filed her case with the Department of Labor and then later
removed her case to the federal district court for the Northern District of Georgia when
the Secretary did not make a final determination within the required 180 days. See
Collins, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1373-74.
74. Id. at 1376.
75. Id. at 1376-77.
76. Id. at 1376 (citing Passaic Valley, 992 F.2d. 474). “The legislative history of
Sarbanes-Oxley states that the reasonableness test ‘is intended to impose the normal
reasonable person standard used and interpreted in a wide variety of legal contexts.’”
148 Cong. Rec., S. 7418, 7420 (citing Passaic Valley, 992 F.2d 474). The threshold is
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further that this standard is intended to encompass all good faith
reporting by employees, 77 and that given the “broad remedial nature” of
Sarbanes-Oxley, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to identify the specific
code section he believes the corporation has violated. 78 Thus defendant
could not win summary judgment simply by asserting that Collins’
claims were too vague and did not rise to the level of those proffered by
Sherron Watkins in the Enron debacle. 79
Other cases have similarly noted that an employee can engage in
“protected activity” under Sarbanes-Oxley by reporting alleged
securities law violations within the company to a person or body in a
supervisory role. 80 In Richards v. Lexmark International, Inc., the
tribunal also took an expansive view of reporting activity where
complainant reported that problems existed with inventory accounting to
his direct supervisor, 81 reasonably believing that such accounting
problems amounted to violations of federal and state anti-fraud laws.82
intended to include “all good faith and reasonable reporting of fraud, and there should
be no presumption that reporting is otherwise, absent specific evidence.” Id. at 1376.
See also Mahony v. Keyspan Corp 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22042 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(reasonable belief possible even where plaintiff lacked expertise to be sure of
accounting irregularities but relied on reports from the Director of Financial
Accounting).
77. Id. at 1376.
78. Id. at 1377. However, in Reddy v. Medquist, Inc., Case No. 2004-SOX-35 at 89, ARB Case No. SOX 04-123 (ARB Sep. 30, 2005), the administrative review board
found that the complainant, a medical transcriptionist, who had complained about the
irregular “counting” of her lines for purposes of her pay did not amount to protected
activity under the relevant whistleblower statute.
79. Collins, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1376; see also supra note 76 and accompanying
text.
80. Richards v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 106, *39 (Oct. 1,
2004). See also Collins, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1377-78. The statute protects internal
reposting as long as reports are made to “a person with supervisory authority over the
employee.” 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C) (2002). The Eastern District of New York
recently denied the respondent company’s motion for summary judgment where the
employee made the whistle “audible” by connecting the CEO with the financial officer
who suspected accounting inaccuracies. Mahony v. Keyspan Corp 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22042 at 3 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). But see Fraser v. Fid. Trust Co. Int’l., 417 F.
Supp. 2d 310 (plaintiff’s whistleblowing attempts barren of any allegations that would
alert defendants that he believed company was violating federal law related to fraud on
shareholders).
81. Richards, 2004 DOLSOX 106, at *13-14.
82. Id. at *38.
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The administrative law judge rejected respondent Lexmark’s motion for
summary judgment urging that Richard’s reports of accounting problems
at Lexmark were not “protected activity” within Sarbanes-Oxley. 83
The Richards decision raises interesting and as yet unanswered
questions under Sarbanes-Oxley about whether an employee must report
his suspicions to someone other than his immediate supervisor. For
example, where an employee innocently reports suspected violations to
his superior and then his superior turns out to have been involved in the
fraud, does this involvement change the employee’s status in some way?
Was he still engaged in good faith reporting? 84 Does the fact that an
employee’s reporting which was done in good faith, but in hindsight
appears to have gone into the “black hole” of his corrupt immediate
supervisor, 85 affect the application of the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower
provisions? 86 The Author is not aware of any reported cases dealing
with these types of entirely plausible factual scenarios and SarbanesOxley whistleblower protection triggers.
Finally, while the Collins and Richards courts appeared to take an
expansive view of reporting activity, 87 other more recent cases present a
troubling judicial view of what is protected reporting under SarbanesOxley. 88 These courts limit the definition of “fraud” under SarbanesOxley to reporting that raises specific concerns about shareholder fraud
vis a vis federal law. 89 In turn, at least one of these cases limits
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provisions so that reports about

83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. at *39.
See Richards v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 2006 DOLSOX 71, at *1; see also Dan W.
Goldfine, Plan Ahead Before Trouble Walks In, 13 BUS. L. TODAY 27 (2004)
(discussing situations where either company counsel or management or both may be
involved in wrongdoing).
86. See, e.g., Collins v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1376
(N.D. Ga. 2004); Richards, 2006 DOLSOX LEXIS 71 at *14.
87. See Collins, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1376; Richards, 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 106 at
*37-38.
88. See, e.g., Bishop v. PCS Admin. (USA), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37230 *29-32
(N.D. Ill. 2006); Wengender v. Robert Half Int’l., Inc., 2006 DOLSOX LEXIS 32, *2834 (Mar. 30, 2006). Cf. Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc., 2006
DOLSOX LEXIS 59, *35-36 (May 31, 2006).
89. See Bishop, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37230 at *29-32; Wengender, 2006
DOLSOX LEXIS 32 at *29-32. Cf. Klopfenstein, 2006 DOLSOX LEXIS 113 at *3536.
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accounting irregularities would not trigger whistleblower protection. 90
C. Employer Must be Aware of Employee’s Protected Activity
The second element of a whistleblower case is that the employer
must be aware of the employee’s protected activity when it takes
adverse action against the employee. 91 For example, if an employee
reported to the federal government, unbeknownst to the corporate
employer, and then the employer acted against the employee, the
employee could not then claim retaliation under the Act. Cases have
held however that constructive or actual knowledge will be sufficient to
satisfy this element of the claim. 92
While simple in theory, the question of who has knowledge when
they act against an employee sometimes contains intricacies not
accounted for in the statute or the cases decided to date. For example,
does a corporate board of directors have constructive knowledge when it
terminates a whistleblowing employee? What about counsel to the
board or the corporation? Can they have constructive knowledge of
whistleblowing activity sufficient to make the respondent liable under
Sarbanes-Oxley? In any event, the U.S. Department of Labor has made
it clear that an employer may not use a “straw-man” to take retaliatory
action against employees, 93 and that “constructive knowledge can be
attributed to the ultimate decision-makers 94 where the complainant’s
immediate supervisor had actual knowledge of complainant’s protected
activities.” 95
90.
91.

See, e.g., Wengender, 2006 DOLSOX LEXIS 32 at *15.
See Richards v Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 106, *34, 39 (Oct.
1, 2004).
92. See, e.g., Henrich v. Ecolab, Inc., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 83, *21-23 (Nov. 23,
2004). But see Anderson v. Jaro Transp. Servs., 2005 DOL Ad. Rev. Bd. LEXIS 128,
*13-14 (Nov. 30, 2005) (noting that complainant’s immediate supervisor did not know
about his protected activity until after she fired him as a basis for the employer’s
defense even where contractor who hired complainant’s employer, and indirectly
complainant, knew of protected activity).
93. Henrich, at *24-25; Platone v. Atl. Coast Airlines Holdings, Inc., 2004
DOLSOX LEXIS 69, at *82-83 (Apr. 30, 2004).
94. But see Anderson, at *13 (noting that immediate supervisory company lacked
knowledge of protected activity, even where company that hired it to do work did know
of complaint).
95. Henrich, at *21-23.
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In some cases, however, the employer may really not know that the
employee has filed a complaint outside the company and thus it would
not be proper to find a basis for retaliatory discrimination. 96 Where an
inference can be drawn that the employer did know that the employee
had made a report of illegal activity, the Department of Labor has held
that the employee will have met its burden to prove this element of the
claim. 97
D. Protected Activity a “Contributing Factor” in
Adverse Employment Action
Perhaps the most significant and most difficult factor to prove in a
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower case is the “contributing factor,” or the
causation, element of the claim. 98 Administrative law judges in the
Department of Labor have repeatedly discussed this element of an
employee’s claim in Sarbanes-Oxley decisions and in other
whistleblower actions under statutes similar to Sarbanes-Oxley, but have
not made clear exactly what an employee must do to meet his burden. 99
In reported cases, the tribunals have noted that the law does not
specifically require an employee to prove that his protected activity was
a “motivating” or “significant” factor in the decision to take adverse
action against him: 100

96. Peck v. Safe Air Int’l, Inc., ALJ No. 2001-AIR-3, at 10-11 (Jan. 30, 2004),
available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/ARB
_DECISIONS/AIR/01AIR03C.HTM (finding that two managers ultimately responsible
for firing of employee did not know about employee’s complaint to the Federal
Aviation Administration under AIR 21 (49 U.S.C. § 42121)).
97. Lederhaus v. Paschen, No. 1991-ERA-13, at 4 (Oct. 26, 1992), available at
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/ARB_DECISION
S/ERA/91ERA13C.HTM.
98. Marano v. Dep’t of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that
employee had to prove that protected activity was a “contributing factor” in employer’s
adverse decision under the Whistleblower Protection Act for federal employees).
99. The ERA, the STAA and AIR are similar to Sarbanes-Oxley in procedures and
proof. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 109-110 and
accompanying text.
100. Marano, 2 F.3d at 1140 (holding that “motivating” or “significant” was
previously the standard under the federal Whistleblower Protection Act). See also
Platone v. Atl. Coast Airlines Holdings, Inc., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 69, at *62 (Apr.
30, 2004).
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The words a “contributing factor” . . . means any factor which, alone
or in connection with other factors, tends to affect in any way the
outcome of the decision. This test is specifically intended to
overrule existing case law, which requires a whistleblower to prove
that his protected conduct was a “significant,” “motivating,”
“substantial,” or “predominant,” factor in a personnel action in order
101
to overturn that action.

A whistleblower need only show that his protected activity had a
role in the decision to act adversely toward him. 102 For reasons
discussed below, this element of a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claim
presents particular evidentiary challenges for employees claiming
retaliatory action under the Act. 103
It is thus difficult, at least initially, for an employee to prove by
direct evidence that his protected activity was a contributing factor in his
termination. 104
The U.S. Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law
Judges has held that where an adverse action closely follows a report
made by an employee, the “sequence of events” can support an inference
of causation. 105 More broadly, the Department of Labor has held that
101. Marano, 2 F.3d at 1140 (interpreting the whistleblower provisions of the
Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(b)(4)(B)(i), 1221(e)(1) (1989)). The
court specifically noted that this test specifically overruled existing case law requiring
the whistleblower to show that his protected conduct was a “significant,’ ‘motivating,’
‘substantial,’ or ‘predominant’ factor in a personnel action.” Id.
102. See id. at 1140. See also Platone, at *81-82.
103. See, e.g., Henrich v. Ecolab, Inc., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 83, *24-25 (Nov. 23,
2004) (noting that complainant had not proved that his protected activities were a
contributing factor in his termination); Robinson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., ARB No. 04041, at 9 (Nov. 30, 2005), available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARB/
DECISIONS/ARB_DECISIONS/AIR/04_041.AIRP.PDF (holding that because six
months had passed since the complainant had written a letter detailing security
violations to the Federal Aviation Authority and the adverse action, and because
complainant had engaged in questionable conduct during that six month period, the
letter detailing the security violations was not a contributing factor in employer’s
decision to take adverse action against complainant); Reines v. Venture Bank and
Venture Financial Group, Case No. 2005-SOX-00112 at 59-60 (ALJ Mar. 13, 2007).
104. See Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp. v. Herman, 115 F.3d 1568, 1573 (11th Cir.
1997) (noting that in reviewing Secretary’s decision for substantial evidence no direct
evidence of retaliation was available in ERA whistleblower case).
105. Lederhaus v. Paschen, No. 1991-ERA-13, 5 (Oct. 26, 1992), available at
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/ARB_DECISION
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“temporal proximity between the protected activities and the adverse
action may be sufficient to establish the inference that the protected
activity was a motivation for the adverse action.” 106 In at least one case,
temporal proximity has been interpreted to mean a period as long as a
year between the reporting activities and the adverse action. 107
Moreover, in the period before the protected activity (where the
complainant is in good standing) and during the protected activity, the
employer would be best served in defeating a Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower claim by showing the occurrence of some intervening
performance event that would justify its adverse action against the
employee and could not possibly be related to the protected activity.108
In one such case, the complainant reported safety violations under
the STAA, 109 a statute similar to Sarbanes-Oxley in procedure and proof,
S/ERA/91ERA13C.HTM.
106. Thomas v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 1989-ERA-00019, 10 (Sept. 17, 1993),
available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/
ARB_DECISIONS/ERA/89ERA19A.HTM. The Department of Labor has also held
close proximity in time of a complainant’s reporting and his discharge does not require
finding of retaliation where the discharge was credibly “explained by a non-retaliatory
motive.” Barnes v. Raymond James & Assocs., 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 2, at *33-34
(Jan. 10, 2005) (complainant discharged where supervisor learned she was leaving to
work for a competitor).
107. Thomas, 1989-ERA-00019, at 10. See also Mahony v. Keyspan Corp 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22042 at 4 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that time between protected
activity and adverse action is just one factor for a jury to consider).
108. Getman v. Sw. Sec., Inc., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 71, at *66-71 (Feb. 2, 2004)
(noting that employer had not indicated that complainant had performance issues until
after she refused to change stock rating and that respondent’s general dishonesty added
to determination that her protected activity contributed to decision to terminate), rev’d
on other grounds, 2005 DOLSOX 18 (Jul. 29, 2005). But see Bechtel v. Competitive
Techs., Inc. 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 44, *108, 111 (Oct. 5, 2005) (finding employee
bonus prior to termination not enough to show “pretext” even when given with an
accompanying complimentary note from management). The administrative court
explained that its decision in Bechtel not to find that the employer had acted on pretext
was at least partially based on the fact that the bonus had been given for work on a
specific project. Id. at *111-12. See Sussberg v. K-Mart Holding Corp., 2-05-CV70378 at 17 (E.D. MI.) (Nov. 15, 2006) (discussing effect of interviewing clients).
109. Anderson v. Jaro Transp. Servs., 2005 DOL Ad. Rev. Bd. LEXIS 128, at *1
(Nov. 30, 2005). The STAA generally prohibits an employer from taking adverse
action against an employee who operates a commercial motor vehicle for making a
safety-related complaint or refusing to operate a vehicle for fear of serious injury.
49 U.S.C. § 31105(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (2006).
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and also governed by the rules of AIR 21. 110 The complainant reported
that a new company rule requiring truck drivers to pick up and deliver
their loads within six hours created a safety issue under STAA.111
Complainant told his supervisor that the new six-hour rule would create
safety issues if he picked up loads in the late evening and was too tired
to drive six hours. 112 After Anderson reported these concerns, he was
warned twice for being late in delivering loads and for sleeping off the
road in his truck. 113 In December 2002, Anderson’s supervisor
terminated his employment, 114 citing the fact that he had made late
deliveries, and had been parking his fully loaded trucks off route,
between the time of Anderson’s safety complaints and his
termination,. 115
Based on these facts, the ARB found that the employer had not
violated the STAA even though the employee had made safety
complaints and was fired within six months of making such
complaints. 116 This was so even though the employer’s purported
legitimate reasons for termination were directly related to the
employee’s safety concerns: actually constituting the basis for his
complaints about safety; and even though the adverse action occurred
within six months of the protected activity. 117 In Anderson, the very
actions that resulted in his termination—pulling off the road to sleep
and keeping loads longer than the six hours allowed by company rules—
were also the very subject of complainant’s safety reporting. 118 Yet,
these actions, according to the ARB, were sufficient legitimate reasons
for the employer’s adverse action, and oddly enough, they were enough
to show that the employee’s reporting of safety concerns had not been
the causal factor 119 in his termination. 120 The Anderson case illustrates
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
Anderson, at *3.
Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *3-4.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *3-4.
See id. at *15-16.
Id. at *8-9 (describing STAA whistleblower provisions generally); see also
supra notes 25-27.
118. See Anderson, at *3-4.
119. In Anderson, the Administrative Review Board applied a standard of proof
slightly different than that which has been applied under Sarbanes-Oxley. Id. at *10
(stating that complainant had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
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the extreme uphill battle a complainant must overcome in proving that
his protected activity ultimately was a contributing factor in the adverse
employment action against him. 121
E. Adverse Employment Action
The Department of Labor has indicated that any negative
employment action will satisfy this element of a whistleblower claim “if
it is reasonably likely to deter employees from making protected
A complainant need not prove termination or
disclosures.” 122
suspension from the job, or even a reduction in salary or
responsibilities. 123 For example, even being placed on a possible “layoff” list has been said to qualify as adverse employment action, even
where the employee was not ultimately laid off. 124
F. The Employer’s Burden to Rebut
While the employee bears the initial burden of proving the elements
of his case by a preponderance of the evidence under Sarbanes-Oxley, 125
the employer can still beat back the claim of discrimination by
protected activity was the “reason for the adverse action”). The ARB effectively held
that Anderson had to prove that the employee’s reporting was the causal factor in the
employer’s decision to act adversely toward complainant. Id. at *15.
120. See id. at *15-16.
121. In addition to finding that Anderson did not prove a causal link between his
reporting and his termination, the ARB found that the employer’s reasons for taking
adverse action were also legitimate—even though they were the same actions that
related to Anderson’s safety complaints. Id. at *3-4, 15-16.
122. The Office of Administrative Law Judges has held, however, that a company’s
filing of a lawsuit against an employee is not an “adverse action” under the Act.
Vodicka v. Dobi Med. Int’l, Inc., 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 101, *23-28 (Dec. 23, 2005).
123. Halloum v. Intel Corp., 2006 DOLSOX LEXIS 5, at *14-15 (Jan. 31, 2006).
See Mahony v. Keyspan Corp 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22042 at 4 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(noting that isolation within company and a change in performance evaluations might
be found to be retaliation).
124. Hendrix v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 87, at *37-38 (Dec. 9,
2003). See also Anderson, at *11-12 (discussing “blacklisting” by a supervisor or
disseminating adverse information that affirmatively prevents a person from finding
employment as a possible adverse employment action and noting that the lower tribunal
held such conduct to be an adverse action within the meaning of the STAA).
125. See supra notes 29-46, 60, and accompanying text.
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proffering “clear and convincing evidence” of legitimate motives for its
adverse actions. 126 In such a case, where there exist both legitimate and
illegitimate motives for the adverse action, the court may engage in what
has frequently been called a “dual motive analysis.” 127 In these cases, if
the employer can show by clear and convincing evidence that it would
have taken the same action in the absence of the protected activity by the
employee, 128 the burden will shift back to the employee to ultimately
persuade the trier of fact that the offered reasons are a mere “pretext” for
the real cause of the adverse action: the protected conduct. 129
Alternatively, the employee can show that his conduct was at least a
contributing factor in the employer’s decision to take adverse action.130
Cases where the employer offers what it calls “clear and convincing
evidence” of a legitimate reason for adverse action put the employee in
an untenable position. 131 In most instances an employee bringing a
126. See Collins v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1375-76 (N.D.
Ga. 2004); Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 41, at *146148, 196 (Jan. 28, 2004) (holding that employer failed to meet its burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that it would have fired Welch even if he had not
engaged in the protected activity); supra note 61 and accompanying text.
127. Overall v. Tenn. Valley Auth., No. 1997-ERA-53, at 33 (Apr. 30, 2001),
available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/
ARB_DECISIONS/ERA/97ERA53D.HTM (holding employer failed to meet the clear
and convincing evidence standard for being “relieved of liability under the ERA in a
dual motive case”); Yule v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 1993-ERA-12, 4-5 (May 24, 1995),
available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/
ARB_DECISIONS/ERA/93ERA12D.HTM (noting that dual motive analysis applied
where illegitimate motives played part in Burns’ decision).
128. Halloum, 2006 DOLSOX LEXIS 5, *16-17. See also Thomas v. Ariz. Pub.
Serv. Co., 1989-ERA-00019, at 10-11 (Sept. 17, 1993) (indicating employer had to
articulate existence of legitimate reasons for adverse action). See also Yule, at 6-7.
129. Bechtel Constr. Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 934-35 (11th Cir. 1995)
(deciding case under the Energy Reorganization Act containing whistleblower
provisions similar to those contained within Sarbanes-Oxley, but requiring the
employee’s reporting conduct be a “motivating” factor in the respondent’s decision to
terminate). See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
130. Platone v. Atl. Coast Airlines Holdings, Inc., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 69, at
*81-82 (Apr. 30, 2004) (determining that protected activity played a role in the decision
to terminate complainant).
131. Bechtel v. Competitive Techs., Inc., 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 44, at *101-103
(Oct. 5, 2005). Bechtel is a case with a long and tortured history. In Bechtel, the OSHA
investigator first found in favor for the employee and ordered preliminary
reinstatement. After a hearing, the administrative law judge found that the employer
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Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claim is also an “at will” employee who
can be fired for just about any reason—at any time—and so most any
reason offered by the employer can be deemed “legitimate” by the
tribunal. 132 Thus, the level of protection offered to at-will employees by
state employment law—as to what constitutes proper dismissal—is the
ultimate determinant of how much protection whistleblowing
employees 133 will actually receive under Sarbanes-Oxley. 134
For example, in Bechtel v. Competitive Technologies, Inc., it
appears that the complainant had been doing at least a reasonably good
job prior to the time when he engaged in a “protected activity.” 135 With
regard to reporting requirements, complainant “raised issues that he
believed needed to be disclosed to the SEC” as well as the “need to
report potential litigation, [and] the need to disclose a change the in
compensation plan” and the appropriateness of some of Respondent’s
representations. 136 Nonetheless, even after OSHA had ordered that
complainant Bechtel be reinstated 137 and even in the face of recent

had put forth clear and convincing evidence of a non-discriminatory motivation for the
termination of complainant Bechtel. In the meantime, the employee had applied to the
federal district court for an order requiring the employer to reinstate the employee
complainant. The district court ordered such reinstatement and the employer appealed
the district court decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed
the district court’s decision, issuing a landmark ruling holding that the preliminary order
of reinstatement remedy referred to in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is most likely not
enforceable by a federal court. Bechtel v. Competitive Techs. Inc., 448 F.3d 469, 47375 (2d Cir. 2006).
132. See Bechtel, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 44, at *108, 111 (stating that at the hearing
stage of proceedings, awarding a bonus to an employee prior to termination not enough
to show “pretext” even when given with an accompanying complimentary note from
management). The court explained that its decision in Bechtel not to find that the
employer had acted on pretext was at least partially based on the fact that the bonus had
been given for work on a specific project. Id. at *111-12.
133. See, e.g., Wieder v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 628, 633-38 (1992); Murphy v. Am.
Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300 (1983).
134. The level of protection for Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowing claimants does not
appear to date to be very high. See infra notes 180-202 and accompanying text
regarding state laws.
135. Bechtel, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 44, at *10.
136. Id. at *99.
137. See Bechtel, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 44 at *3. But see Bechtel v. Competitive
Techs. Inc., 448 F.3d 469, 472-74 (2d Cir. 2006).
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positive commendations by the employer, 138 the ALJ did not find in
complainant Bechtel’s favor at a hearing. 139 While the ALJ found that
Bechtel’s reporting activities did contribute to his discharge, 140 the
Respondent was able to put forth “clear and convincing evidence” of a
reason for discharge wholly unrelated to the protected activity. 141
Because respondent was able to point to financial reasons for
complainant’s termination—something most any employer might
legitimately claim—complainant was unable to prove that respondent’s
legitimate reasons were pretextual. 142 This was so even though Mr.
Bechtel received a bonus, shares of stock, and positive performance
analysis just prior to his termination. 143
In the meantime, Bechtel had already applied to the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut for enforcement of the
investigator’s preliminary order of reinstatement made before the ALJ
hearing. 144 Ultimately, the Second Circuit determined that because the
order of reinstatement was not a “final order,” the court lacked
jurisdiction to enforce it. 145
Bechtel illustrates again the extreme difficulty a Sarbanes-Oxley
complainant has in proving his case at a hearing where he is an
employee at will, and where any reason for his discharge can be viewed
as a legitimate one. 146 Additionally in Bechtel, the Second Circuit struck
a mighty blow to the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protections in
refusing to enforce the preliminary reinstatement order, 147 further
discouraging would be whistleblowers from reporting what they know.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Bechtel, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 44 at *10.
Id. at *117-118.
Id. at *100.
Id. at *107.
Id. at *108-112.
Id.
Bechtel v. Competitive Techs., Inc., 448 F.3d 469, 471 (2d Cir. 2006). The
Bechtel case is currently pending before the ARB.
145. Id. at 472-74. The district court had held the order of reinstatement order
enforceable. Id. at 473. The circuit court dissent in Bechtel argued that the majority
opinion contravenes the clear intent of Congress. Id. at 484-85 (Straub, J., dissenting)
(“The language and history of the Act . . . evince a strong [c]ongressional preference for
reinstatement as a means of encouraging whistleblowing.”).
146. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
147. See Bechtel, 448 F.3d at 472-74.
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III. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN SARBANES-OXLEY AND EXISTING STATE
LAW: NEW YORK, NEW JERSEY, AND TEXAS COMPARED
Although Congress sought to improve protections for
whistleblowers with Sarbanes-Oxley, 148 most employees involved in
whistleblower proceedings will be “at-will” employees. It is this state
law “at-will” underpinning that creates the biggest overall obstacle for
whistleblowers under Sarbanes-Oxley and the biggest impediment to
successful implementation of the legislatively stated goal—that of
encouraging employees to openly report evidence of corporate fraud. 149
At its most extreme, the doctrine of at-will employment generally
provides that an employee with no set period of employment may be
discharged at any time for any reason except a discriminatory reason. 150
In other words, an employee in a state that is less protective of
employees may properly be dismissed for “wearing a red shirt.” 151 The
difficulty for the employee thus comes in trying to prove that the real
reason for the adverse action was discrimination or retaliation, rather
than “the red shirt”—as even the “red shirt” is generally enough reason
to fire an at-will employee.
Sarbanes-Oxley impacts state law by disallowing adverse action
against an employee where the employee’s protected activity contributed
to the decision to act adversely. 152 In this manner, Sarbanes-Oxley adds
another illegal reason to the list for firing the at-will employee in all
state jurisdictions. 153 Likewise, the employer would be forced to state
some other reason for its adverse action, although almost any reason
could be deemed legitimate by a reviewing tribunal. 154 And of course,
employees in all states continue to benefit from state employment laws
148.
149.
150.

See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
See Wieder v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 628, 633 (1992); Murphy v. Am. Home Prods.
Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300 (1983).
151. See, e.g., Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 297-98 (dismissing employee’s tort based
claim for discharge where employer had discharged employee for reporting accounting
improprieties prior to the effective date of Sarbanes-Oxley).
152. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
153. Of course, the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution requires that
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act trump state employment at-will doctrine where an employee’s
actions are so protected. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
154. See, e.g., Anderson v. Jaro Transp. Servs., 2005 DOL Ad. Rev. Bd. LEXIS
128, *15-17 (Nov. 30, 2005).
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that do not contradict or contravene the intent or language of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 155 Many of these state whistleblower laws are,
however, narrowly drawn or offer little protection for those blowing the
whistle on securities fraud. 156
In New York, for example, the state whistleblower statute only
protects employees from retaliation when the employee reports a
violation that specifically affects the public health. 157 Employees are
otherwise left largely unprotected under the state’s common law, 158
while employers are heavily protected by the common law doctrine of at
will employment. 159 For example, the New York State Court of Appeals
reaffirmed its longstanding commitment not to imply obligations into
the employer/employee relationship absent some authority to do so from
the legislature in Murphy v. American Home Products. 160 In Murphy,
the Court refused to recognize the tort of “abusive discharge” in the
employee at will relationship 161 and refused to even imply an obligation
of good faith into the relationship. 162
Similarly, an employee physician brought a claim in New York
state court against her employer for wrongful discharge after she refused
to share other employees’ confidential medical information with the
employer in Horn v. New York Times. 163 The Court refused to find that
the contract had implied terms where doing so would not further the
underlying agreement of the parties. 164 The court held that the physician
employee was really engaged in a managerial role, charged with

155. See, e.g. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2) (2006) (protecting whistleblowing
employees in New York State that report violations that create a threat to public health
or safety). See also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
156. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2).
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300-01 (1983).
159. See, e.g. Remba v. Fed. Employment and Guidance Serv., 149 A.D.2d 131,134
(1st Dept. 1989), aff’d, 76 N.Y.2d 801 (1991); Weider v. Scala, 80 N.Y.2d 628, 633
(1992) (implying exception to at-will employment contract where implied obligation
would further employment contract’s underlying terms); Horn v. New York Times, 100
N.Y.2d 85, 95 (2003) (declining to find exception to at-will employment agreement and
holding in favor of employer even where employee presented sympathetic facts).
160. Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 300-02.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 304-05.
163. Horn, 100 N.Y.2d at 95.
164. Id. at 94.
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determining whether employees’ injuries were work-related. 165 Any
medical care that she actually gave, the court reasoned, was ancillary to
the managerial role she played. 166 The court thus held that not
disclosing patient confidences was not central to her role as an
employee, and implying the obligation of confidentiality would not be in
Absent
“furtherance” of the employer/employee relationship. 167
legislative change, the court in Horn refused to imply such an obligation
into the contract. 168 Horn thus illustrates a situation where New York’s
highest court allowed an employer to legally dismiss the plaintiff, an atwill employee, even though the employer’s conduct appeared to be
unethical and the employee appeared to be acting properly. 169
In contrast, under New Jersey law, at-will employees receive
greater protection against adverse actions when they are acting
specifically to serve the public good. A New Jersey court noted that
New Jersey’s whistleblower statute protected an employee who blew the
whistle about his employer’s use of unlicensed workers in Donofry v.
Autotote Systems, Inc. 170 Other New Jersey courts, however, have noted
that where an employee acts merely in his own interests and only
indirectly serves the public good, he will not be protected by New
Jersey’s whistleblower statue and will be subject to the vagaries and
lesser protections of New Jersey state common law. 171
Similarly under Texas law, for example, the at-will employee gets
little protection from state law. In Texas, the at-will relationship can be
terminated despite the whistleblowing status of the person or persons
subject to termination. 172 One Texas court held that a law firm was not
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 95.
Id.
Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 304-05 (citing Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88

(1917)).
168. See Horn, 100 N.Y.2d at 94.
169. Id.; but see Fraser v. Fid. Trust Co. Intl., 417 F. Supp. 2d 310, 324-25
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (allowing breach of contract claim alongside Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower claim where employee manual stated that employees were responsible
for reporting illegal conduct).
170. Donofry v. Autotote Sys., Inc., 795 A.2d 260 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)
(applying the Conscientious Employees’ Projection Act (“CEPA”), N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:19-3 (West 1988)).
171. Demas v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, 712 A.2d 693, 696 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div.1998); see also Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 828 A.2d 883 (N.J. 2003).
172. Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Tex. 1998).
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liable in tort to a lawyer/whistleblower who reported overbilling of the
firm’s clients in Bohatch v. Butler and Binion. 173
In summary, if the corporate whistleblower is not specifically
protected by a state whistleblower statute, he must rely on state common
law, which will generally offer little protection, or ultimately on
Sarbanes-Oxley protection. The problem thus becomes one of circular
reasoning, in that Sarbanes-Oxley actually allows an employer to escape
liability if the employer can show that he discharged the employee for a
legitimate reason. 174 Since almost any reason is a legitimate reason
under many states laws, the employer can simply urge that the employee
was fired for reasons other than his reporting and escape liability under
Sarbanes-Oxley. 175
In the final analysis, the only way the Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower can survive an employer’s proof of legitimate action is if
he can get the court to engage in a “dual motive” analysis. 176 Having
decided that both discriminatory and the non-discriminatory motives
played a part in the decision to terminate the whistleblower, the tribunal
can decide whether the employer would have dismissed the employee if
not for the whistle blowing activity. If the tribunal determines that
absent the whistleblowing activity, the employer would not have acted
adversely toward the employee, even though the employee also had a
legitimate reason for action, then the court will rule in favor of the
employee. 177 The problem is that courts and administrative tribunals
have not routinely engaged in the “dual motive” 178 analysis. The result
is that the employer simply offers what would otherwise be a legitimate
reason for its adverse action against the employee, thereby vitiating any
real Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection. 179 It thus appears that the
convergence of the at-will employment doctrine and the burden set out
for a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower, leave the whistleblower largely

173.
174.

Id. at 546-47.
See Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., Case No. 2005 SOX 33, at 39-40
(A.L.J. Mar. 29, 2005).
175. Id.
176. See Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airlines Holdings, Inc., Case No., 2003 SOX 27,
at 28 (A.L.J. Apr. 30, 2004).
177. Id.
178. See, e.g. Bechtel v. Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d 469, 472-75 (2d Cir.
2006).
179. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
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unprotected.
IV. THE BREADTH AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SARBANES-OXLEY
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS
A. Sarbanes-Oxley Statistics to Date
The U.S. Department of Labor’s own statistics bear out this lack of
protection for Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers. 180 As of June 2005, the
Department of Labor had compiled a comprehensive list of statistics on
Sarbanes-Oxley cases. As of that month, 492 whistleblower cases had
been filed under Sarbanes-Oxley and 99 of those cases181 were still
pending before OSHA in the investigative stage of the proceedings. 182
Of the total number filed, 58 cases had been voluntarily withdrawn
before OSHA issued any findings. 183 Some of these 58 cases have likely
been filed in federal court, as is allowed pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley, if
more than 180 days had passed before a final decision in the matter. 184
OSHA investigators had completed 393 cases, 185 with 289 of those
dismissed for lack of merit. 186 Thus, as of June 2005, OSHA had
dismissed prior to a hearing almost 82% of the cases that it had decided
under Sarbanes-Oxley. 187
Only 64 of the cases before OSHA were found to have merit. 188 Of
180. Telephone Interview with Nilgen Tolek, Dir. of Office of Investigative
Assistance, Occupation Safety and Health Admin. (June 13, 2005) [hereinafter Tolek
Interview] (describing the status of cases filed under Sarbanes-Oxley); Telephone
Interview with Nilgen Tolek, Dir. of Office of Investigative Assistance, Occupation
Safety and Health Admin. (June 16, 2005) [hereinafter Tolek Interview II] (describing
the status of cases filed under Sarbanes-Oxley).
181. Tolek Interview II, supra note 180 and accompanying text (describing the
status of cases filed under Sarbanes-Oxley).
182. Tolek Interview, supra note 180 and accompanying text (describing the status
of cases filed under Sarbanes-Oxley).
183. Tolek Interview, supra note 180 and accompanying text.
184. 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,117 (part 1980.114).
185. Tolek Interview, supra note 180.
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. Tolek Interview, supra note 180. The total cases reported include all those
filed with OSHA under Sarbanes-Oxley and some of these cases have multiple
complainants. Determinations made by OSHA are counted separately for each
complainant. Thus there exists a discrepancy between the number of cases filed, and
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those found to have merit, the parties settled 49 prior to a hearing. 189
These statistics indicate that it is very difficult for a complainant to
succeed at the initial stage of the Sarbanes-Oxley proceedings, the stage
in which OSHA makes its initial determination before a hearing. 190
Once a complainant requests a hearing before an administrative law
judge, he fairs even worse. 191 The Office of Administrative Law Judges
reported that, as of April 2005, 192 it had docketed 155 total cases under
Sarbanes-Oxley, and decided 119 cases. 193 As of June 2005, only four
out of the 119 total whistleblower complainants under Sarbanes-Oxley
had been successful at a hearing. 194 Nineteen of the cases were settled,
and 24 chose to pursue their claims in federal court, 195 where the author
only knows of a handful of successful plaintiffs who have survived
motions for summary judgment by the corporate employer 196 and one
those in which OSHA has made a determination. Id.
189. Tolek Interview, supra note 180.
190. See id. For example, Sarbanes-Oxley plaintiff Mahoney recently survived an
employer’s motion for summary judgment in the district court proceeding where his
case had previously been found to lack merit by OSHA. Mahony v. Keyspan Corp
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22042 at 2, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
191. Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Complaints Docketed Before the U.S.
Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges, Statistical Overview as of
April 28, 2005 (on file with author) [hereinafter OALJ Statistical Overview].
192. According to a senior attorney with the Office of Administrative Law Judges,
statistics on the number and disposition of future cases and decisions since June 2005
will not be compiled in the near future. Telephone Interview with Tod Smith, Senior
Attorney, Office of Administrative law Judges (January 24,2006) [hereinafter Smith
Interview I].
193. Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Complaints Docketed Before the U.S.
Department of Labor, Office of Distractive Law Judges, Statistical Overview as of
April 28, 2005 (on file with author) [hereinafter OALJ Statistical Overview]. Of the
289 cases dismissed by the Secretary before a hearing, the parties only requested that
the Office of Administrative Law judges take jurisdiction for purposes of a hearing in
155 of these complaints.
194. OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 193.
195. Id.
196. See Collins v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1380-81 (N.D.
Ga. 2004); Fraser v. Fid. Trust Co. Intl., 417 F. Supp. 2d 310, 322-23, 325 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (holding that complainant’s reporting did not have to rise to level of that reported
by Sherron Watkins to trigger protection of statute); Romaneck v. Deutsche Asset
Mgmt., No. C05-2473 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (denying summary judgment where
complainant raised fact issue concerning causation element of Sarbanes-Oxley claim);
Mahony v. Keyspan Corp 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22042 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); supra note
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other widely publicized case that had been scheduled for trial, but has
been reportedly settled as of this writing. 197
B. The Appearance of Bias
The statistics from the pending and past administrative proceedings
in Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases point to a problem. 198 A
complainant has only a small statistical chance of success prior to a
hearing, 199 and if a complainant does request a hearing after a
determination of his claim by OSHA, it appears that he has an even
smaller chance of success, as only four of the 119 cases docketed for
hearing have resulted in a positive outcome for the complainant. 200
There thus appears to be an inherent bias against the complainant at the
investigative and hearing stages of the proceedings. 201 Employees are
having a difficult time refuting their employer’s defenses in SarbanesOxley whistleblower proceedings . 202
In addition to the fact that there appears to be an inherent bias
against employees in Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases, there are
other substantive and procedural problems with the Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower provisions. These problems are discussed in Parts IV.C
and IV.D below.
C. Procedural Problems Inherent in Sarbanes-Oxley
Whistleblower Proceedings
1. Timing
Given that the Sarbanes-Oxley administrative procedure was
designed to be an expedited proceeding, 203 the respondent employer
theoretically has 20 days from receipt of the complaint to meet with
190.
197. Sudeep Reddy, TXU Opts to Settle Whistleblower Suit, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, June 10, 2005. For more information, see Murray v. TXU Corp., 279 F. Supp.
2d 799 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
198. OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 193.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. See Id.
202. See supra notes 180-202 and accompanying text.
203. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,107.
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OSHA and present evidence in support of its position. 204 If the OSHA
investigator believes that the respondent employer has violated the Act,
and that preliminary relief for the complainant is warranted, 205 OSHA
notifies the employer, who is then supposed to have ten business days to
respond with legal and factual arguments in support to of its position, 206
arguing against a preliminary award of relief. 207
Ideally, these proposed time frames might help level a playing field
stacked heavily in favor of the employer. While the employer will often
have more resources, the one advantage the employee has in a
whistleblower proceeding, at least initially, is that he is intimately
familiar with the facts surrounding the adverse action against him. Such
familiarity with the facts would be extremely helpful in a fast-paced
proceeding. Yet the implementing regulations, laying out these strict
time guidelines, are not being enforced by the U.S. Department of
Labor. 208 When the Department of Labor grants the parties extra time,
contrary to the implementing procedures, these extensions most often
benefit the employer and hurt the employee, who is likely unemployed
and in dire need of immediate relief.
2. Access to Information and Witnesses and One-Sided Submissions
The initial implementing procedures for the investigation also stack
the odds against the employee because they allow employers to make
submissions to OSHA to which the employee has no access, and to
These
which he does not have the opportunity to respond. 209
submissions can be damaging, and in some cases may contain
inaccuracies that will lead to a decision adverse to the employee.
Perhaps more importantly, the employer has open access to current
employee “witnesses,” who have every motivation to support the
employer and make sworn statements on its behalf at every stage in the

204.
205.
206.
207.

69 Fed. Reg. at 52,106.
69 Fed. Reg. at 52,107.
Id.
Id. This section is expressly stated to provide due process protection to the
Respondent in accord with the United States Supreme Court’s decision under another
whistleblower statute, the STAA. Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252
(1987).
208. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
209. 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,106.
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investigative proceeding. Such statements put current employees in
good stead and allow current employees to avoid siding with a former
whistleblowing employee who is now suing their employer.
3. Is the Administrative Proceeding a Forced Waiting Period?
Finally, the administrative proceeding before OSHA might be
considered a forced waiting period for the Sarbanes-Oxley complainant.
While it is true that the Sarbanes-Oxley complainant can file a complaint
in Federal Court if the Secretary of Labor has not issued a final decision
within 180 days of the filing, many complainants may endure the wait
and do just this. Since a multitude of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower
cases will not be investigated and completed to final decision in 180
days, 210 the complainant is literally required to endure a one-sided
prolonged administrative proceeding with no real hope of quick
satisfaction before he may seek redress in federal court. This aspect of
Sarbanes-Oxley wastes administrative resources and frustrates vigilant
good faith litigants—litigants who may now be now out of work and
without incoming resources.
Indeed, the length of the OSHA
administrative proceeding may actually force the complaining employee
to take positions he might otherwise have resisted. 211
D. Applying Burden Shifting to Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Cases
and Issues of Proof: Substantive Problems In Whistleblower Cases
While general discrimination law is not specifically applicable to
Sarbanes-Oxley cases, 212 a complaining party under Sarbanes-Oxley,
just as in a garden-variety discrimination case, must somehow prove that
he was treated wrongly. A Sarbanes-Oxley plaintiff must initially prove
his case at a hearing by a preponderance of the evidence. 213 As in past
types of discrimination cases, this then causes a burden shifting
analysis. 214 Whereas the burden shifting analysis in discrimination cases
210.
211.
212.
213.

See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
See e.g. Tolek Interview, supra note 180.
Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 115 F.3d 1568, 1572 (11th Cir. 1997).
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C) (expressly incorporating burdens of proof
contained in 49 U.S.C. 42121 (b); see supra notes 26-28, 60 and accompanying text.
214. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b).
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was originally determined by the U.S. Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas, 215 under Sarbanes-Oxley, the evidentiary framework is
provided by statute and is slightly less onerous for the employee.216
Initially, suffice it to say that the Sarbanes-Oxley plaintiff must prove
that he was treated adversely, and that his protected activities
contributed to the decision to treat him wrongly and must do this by a
“preponderance of the evidence.” 217 The employer must then present
“clear and convincing evidence” of a legitimate reason for its adverse
action. 218 If the employer succeeds in this proof, the employee must
ultimately bear the burden of showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that the reason proffered by the employer is pretextual. 219
1. Issues of Proof
Past discrimination cases are illustrative, if not for the exact
application of the complainant’s burden of proof, then for the kinds of
evidence a complainant may use to show he was treated differently, and
ultimately, wrongfully. 220 In past discrimination cases, the courts have
noted that a plaintiff may prove discrimination, lacking any direct
evidence, with circumstantial evidence 221 such as proof of disparate
treatment 222 or with proof of a pattern of past discrimination. 223 As
215.
216.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b) (expressly incorporating standards in 49 U.S.C. 42121
(b)(2)(A) (“AIR 21”); Collins v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 137475 (N.D. Ga. 2004). The framework in Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases thus
requires the complainant to bear the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of
the evidence. If he succeeds, the employer may rebut the presumption of discrimination
with clear and convincing evidence that its actions were supported by legitimate nondiscriminatory motives. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b) (expressly incorporating standards in 49
U.S.C. 42121 (b)(2)(A) (“AIR 21”); see supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. The
difference between the two frameworks is more fully discussed infra note 236.
217. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b) (expressly incorporating standards in AIR 21, 49 U.S.C.
§ 42121 (b)(2)(A). Cases under AIR 21 adopt the preponderance of the evidence
standard. See supra note 213.
218. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b).
219. See Halloum v. Intel Corp., 2003-SOX-7 at 13/21 (ALJ Mar. 4, 2004).
220. See e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003); Riley v. Emory
Univ., 2005 WL 1395045, at *2 (11th Cir. Jun. 14, 2005).
221. See e.g., Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 100-101 (acknowledging the utility of
circumstantial evidence in discrimination cases).
222. See e.g., Riley v. Emory Univ., 2005 WL 1395045, at *2 (11th Cir. Jun. 14,
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these kinds of evidence are often not available to a whistleblowing
employee—since he may be the first to “blow the whistle”—the ability
to beat back an employer’s “clear and convincing” evidence of
legitimate motives is more limited for the “whistleblowing” employee
under Sarbanes-Oxley. 224
Moreover, employers appear ready and able to offer up seemingly
“legitimate” reasons for their adverse employment actions. 225 They are
able to find some fault of an employee (as one would expect, since we
are dealing with human subjects) and defeat most whistleblower
claims. 226 In this way, employers appear able to easily defeat SarbanesOxley whistleblower claims. 227
This is not surprising given that within the confines of many states’
common law, almost any seemingly sensible reason for discharge of an
at-will employee will suffice. 228 Although the courts have noted that
Congress intended an employer to have a difficult time proving that a
“legitimate” reason existed for an adverse action taken against a
whistleblowing employee protected by Sarbanes-Oxley and other federal
whistleblower laws, 229 this does not appear to be the case. 230
2. Burden Shifting Under Sarbanes-Oxley
The burden-shifting framework under Sarbanes-Oxley also presents
difficulties for the whistleblower, 231 both because he is an employee at
2005).
223. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
224. See infra notes 263-64, 280, 282 and accompanying text.
225. See e.g., Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., 2005-SOX-00033, at 39-40 (citing
financial reasons as basis for complainant’s discharge).
226. See OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 193.
227. See id.
228. Indeed, employers are often known to successfully claim a bad attitude as a
reason for discharge. See, e.g., Platone v. Atl. Coast Airlines Holdings, Inc., 2004
DOLSOX LEXIS 69, at *84 (Apr. 30, 2004); Yule v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 1993-ERA12, at 6-7 (May 24, 1995), available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/
WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/ARB_DECISIONS/ERA/93ERA12D.HTM (noting
“insubordination” as basis for termination).
229. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp. v. Herman, 115 F.3d 1568, 1572 (11th Cir.
1997).
230. See, e.g., Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 44 at
*101-07. See also OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 191.
231. See, e.g., Platone, 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 69; Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares
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will, as are most other plaintiffs in discrimination suits, and because he
is in a unique position. This is so in that in the vast majority of cases,
there will have been no past whistleblowing and no history or pattern of
discrimination to draw on in proving his case. 232 Lacking these
similarly situated persons, and faced with a seemingly legitimate reason
for adverse action by the employer, 233 the “whistleblowing” complainant
has extreme difficulty ever rebutting the employer’s clear and
convincing evidence of its legitimate motive for adverse action. 234
Moreover, while it is somewhat rare for an employer to be unaware
of an employee’s status in a Title VII discrimination case, 235 —it would
be very difficult, for example, for an employer to claim it did not know
an employee’s sex or race—it is much more common for an employer in
a “whistleblowing” situation to claim that it was unaware of the
employee’s protected status when it acted adversely against him. 236
These evidentiary difficulties are borne out in the Sarbanes-Oxley
cases decided to date. 237 While a few complainants have been
successful in proving their cases at an initial hearing, most have not
because their employer puts forth evidence of a “legitimate,” nondiscriminatory motive for the adverse action. 238 Employers may be able
Corp., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 41 (Jan. 28, 2004).
232. This stands in contrast to cases determined under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05
(1973) (noting that statistics as to petitioner employer’s past hiring practices conformed
to a “general pattern” of discrimination).
233. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
234. See OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 191 (citing statistics on the
resolution of OSHA cases before and after hearings); Tolek Interview supra note 180.
235. Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that
normally an employer would have reason to know a complaining employee’s age, but
here the decision to terminate was made by officials at an acquiring company who had
apparently never met complainant or reviewed her personnel file).
236. See Overall v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 1997-ERA-53 at 9 (Apr. 30, 2001),
available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/ARB
_DECISIONS/ERA/97ERA53D.HTM (noting employer managers alleged they were
unaware of complainant’s activity when he was laid off). Cases arising under the ERA
closely parallel the McDonnell Douglas framework in terms of burdens of proof. Id. at
12 (noting that employer had articulated a legitimate reason for its actions).
237. See supra notes 180-203 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 44, at
*102-104 (Oct. 5, 2005); Taylor v. Wells Fargo, Tex., 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 7, at *3538 (Feb. 14, 2005) (holding that respondent prevails despite complainant’s
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to easily offer what might be seen as “clear and convincing” evidence of
such reasons, even if in the form of affidavits or testimony of current
employees. 239 In the face of these “witness” statements, from those
current employees obviously hoping to please and certainly hoping not
to anger their current employers, the whistleblowing employee has great
difficulty proving that the stated “legitimate motive” is a pretext for the
real reason for the termination. 240
In one example, a complainant was terminated after she reported
missing serviceable tags for aircraft parts, a protected report under AIR
21, and after receiving numerous commendations and raises for her good
work at the company in Parshley v. America West Airlines. 241 The
employer countered, alleging that she had been selected for termination
based on performance issues and for cost-cutting purposes. 242 The
employer made these assertions although no performance issues were
noted in her personnel files prior to her termination, and the employer
subsequently hired an outside employee to fill Parshley’s place. 243 The
court nonetheless accepted the employer’s testimony as credible 244 and
decided that Parshley could not meet her ultimate burden of proof, even
where the employer’s hiring of a new outside person belied the
employer’s stated reason for termination. 245
While Parshley illustrates just how the burden-shifting framework
of Sarbanes-Oxley might present unique problems for the whistleblower

demonstration that her protected activity was a factor in respondent’s retaliation);
Halloum v. Intel Corp., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 73, at *47-48 (Mar. 4, 2004) (noting
that judges may draw inferences of causation of employer’s retaliatory action from the
facts of the case).
239. See, e.g., Bechtel, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 44, at *101-08; Parshley v. Am. W.
Airlines, No. 2002-AIR-10, at 52-53 (A.L.J. Aug. 5, 2002), available at
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/ALJ_DECISION
S/AIR/02AIR10B.HTM.
240. See, e.g., Taylor, at *35-36 (noting even if retaliation was a factor in adverse
action against employee, respondent put forth a legitimate non-discriminatory motive
for its adverse action); Halloum, at *47-55 (noting that although retaliatory action
inferred ultimate decision for respondent in that respondent proved legitimate motive).
241. Parshley, at 53-54.
242. Id. at 54.
243. Id. at 55.
244. Id. at 54-55.
245. Id. at 55.
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under Sarbanes-Oxley 246 a small handful of cases that have been decided
thus far have actually parsed through employer’s explanations and come
to equitable decisions. 247 In these cases, the court has looked closely at
an employer’s motivations, specifically noting that a “whistleblowing”
employee may sometimes “touch a nerve” 248 with his activities.
Although there may be no direct evidence of a past discriminatory
pattern by the employer or direct evidence that an employer took
adverse action based on the protected activity, the investigating and
ultimate reporting may have caused the employer to look upon the
employee with disfavor. 249
In Platone, the court held that even though the airline for which
Platone worked could have legitimately terminated her because she was
romantically involved with another employee (involvement that was
prohibited by her employer), 250 her reporting nonetheless contributed to
the decision to fire her. 251 The court held that the company had to bear
the risk that the legal and illegal motives could not be separated. 252 Thus
employing a “dual motive” analysis, 253 the administrative law judge
found that where Platone demonstrated that her reporting activities
contributed to the decision to take adverse action against her, the
decision would be in favor of the employee. 254 The court noted that it is
not enough that under the circumstances in retrospect, the employer
made its decision on legitimate grounds. 255 Rather, the employer’s

246.
247.

Id. at 53-55.
See, e.g., Platone v. Atl. Coast Airlines, 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 69, at *86-87
(Apr. 30, 2004); Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 41, at
*184-196 (Jan. 28, 2004) (holding that respondent employer could not present clear and
convincing evidence of legitimate reason for termination).
248. Platone, at *77.
249. Id. at *81 (noting that Platone’s supervisors were unhappy that she was
“looking into the flight loss issue”).
250. Id. at *84.
251. Platone, at *81-82; see also Asst. Sec’y of Labor for Occupational Safety and
Health v. Morin Transp., Inc., Case No. 92-STA-41, at 5 (Oct. 1, 1993),
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/ARB_DECISION
S/STA/92STA41B.HTM (discussing dual motive analysis).
252. Platone, at *85.
253. Id. at *84-86.
254. Id. at *87.
255. Id. at *85.
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motivation at the time it made its decision is what must be considered. 256
The Platone court was unwilling to accept the employer’s testimony that
there was discontent with the complainant, and general performance
issues without some additional contemporaneous proof, such as that
which might be found in a personnel file or other periodic reporting
file. 257
E. Practical Difficulties for Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers
In addition to facing the procedural and substantive difficulties
inherent in the Sarbanes-Oxley administrative proceeding, the
whistleblowing complainant also faces unique practical challenges that
make it difficult for him to meet his burden of proof.
1. Disgraced and Out of Work
In a typical whistleblowing situation, the whistleblower has
reported what he knows to his superior, who may or may not be
involved in the alleged corporate fraud, or reported the same to the
board of directors, and is now potentially disgraced and out of work. It
is at this juncture—psychologically weakened and potentially publicly
disgraced—that he must become ready and poised to fight a corporate
giant. 258
2. Inequity in Resources
As discussed above, Sarbanes-Oxley complainants have enjoyed
little success. 259 This is not a surprise when one considers the vast
inequity in resources between the employees and the public companies
involved in a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower proceeding. 260 Given vast
resources, it appears that these large employers can easily beat back
accusations of improper termination based on whistleblowing so that the
256.
257.
258.

Id.
See id. at *85-86.
Sarbanes-Oxley by definition only applies to “whistleblowing” in “publicly
traded” companies, entities that are by nature large corporate entities. Sarbanes-Oxley
§ 806 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)).
259. See supra notes 180-202 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
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employee may never have the opportunity to produce enough evidence
to make it beyond the investigative stage of the proceedings. 261
Alternatively, the employer’s resources allows it to mount an aggressive
defense at the hearing stage, where it can readily offer what might be
deemed “clear and convincing evidence” of its legitimate reason for
adverse action. 262
3. Witnesses are not Available or Willing to Testify
Another difficult and potentially insurmountable obstacle for the
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower is that he is uniquely situated as an
outsider with information to report vis a vis his former co-workers and
the corporation.
Indeed, the situation that leads him to have
“whistleblowing” information in the first place may have put him at
odds with his colleagues, superiors and the board of directors of the
corporation. The damaging information did not likely just come to rest
on his desk. A whistleblower may have sought the information out over
time; he may have been perceived as an uncooperative person; 263 or “not
a team player” as he indirectly or directly disagreed with corporate
action or inaction in some manner. His role may be defined by his
unwillingness to go along, and he is thus described as “uncooperative.”
Moreover, this may be a game of egg and chicken: which came first, the
“uncooperative” attitude or the unwillingness to engage in unethical and
potentially illegal fraudulent behavior? 264
Finally, an angry employee, because he does not like a general
“unethical atmosphere,” may actually find reason to “sniff around,”
further alienating himself from his co-workers and superiors. As he
engages in this hunt for information, he alienates himself further 265 from
those in positions of power and becomes even more intent on finding

261.
262.
263.

See supra notes 32-39, 186-187 and accompanying text.
But see Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 115 F.3d 1568, 1572 (11th Cir. 1997).
See Platone v. Atl. Coast Airlines, 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 69, at *75-76 (Apr.
30, 2004).
264. Getman v. Sw. Sec., Inc., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 71, at *60, 68 (Feb. 2, 2004)
(noting the employer did not complain of poor performance until after the analyst
refused to change a stock rating), rev’d on other grounds, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 18
(Jul. 29, 2005); see also infra note 265 and accompanying text.
265. See, e.g., Platone, at *77 (noting that Platone “did in fact touch a nerve” with
her investigation).
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something wrong at the corporation. Indeed, he may relish the idea of
“ratting the company out.” The position of the corporate whistleblower
is thus different than the classic discrimination case, in that his case of
retaliatory discrimination may develop over time, and he may actually
be directly pitted against those persons in power who are engaged in
wrongdoing. On the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that in many
classic discrimination claimants, such as those that lay claim under Title
VII, 266 claimants are not initially antagonistic toward those in
supervisory roles.
4. Mandatory Arbitration Agreements
Further complicating matters for the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower
is the fact that he may have signed a mandatory arbitration agreement
with his employer. At least one court has held that a Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower claim is subject to mandatory arbitration even though the
Sarbanes-Oxley proceeding is a statutory discrimination proceeding.267
One commentator has posited that applying these mandatory arbitration
agreements to Sarbanes-Oxley plaintiffs weakens employee positions
because arbitration generally favors employers. 268
The above procedural, substantive and practical difficulties make it
difficult for a corporate whistleblower to succeed. If employees are
willingly to witness and report fraud, changes are needed in the
implementing procedures of Sarbanes-Oxley, the effectuation of those
procedures, and in the manner in which the employer’s burden of proof
is met.
266.
267.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Boss v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 684, 685 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). The United States Supreme Court has also held that mandatory arbitration
agreements may apply to compel arbitration in employee discrimination cases. See
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119-23 (2001). The Supreme Court
limited its decision somewhat in Equal Employment Opportunity Comm. v. Waffle
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294-98 (2002) (holding that employment discrimination
claim could proceed in EEOC even where the employee was party to a mandatory
arbitration agreement). Overall, it appears that the Supreme Court favors enforcement
of mandatory arbitration agreements even in the context of an employee’s
discrimination claims.
268. Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers
and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L.
REV. 1029, 1082-83 (2004).
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V. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS
A. Adherence to the Regulatory Timelines
The Department of Labor presently does not closely adhere to the
timelines provided under Sarbanes-Oxley. 269 Given that the SarbanesOxley administrative procedure was designed to be an expedited
proceeding, 270 OSHA should adhere strictly to the administrative
timelines contained in the implementing regulations. 271 The Respondent
thus would have a limited twenty days from receipt of the complaint to
meet with OSHA and present evidence in support to of its position. 272 If
the OSHA investigator then believed that the respondent employer had
violated the Act, and that preliminary relief for the complainant was
warranted, 273 the employer would only have another very limited period
of ten business days to respond and argue against the preliminary award
of relief. 274
If OSHA would adhere to these timelines, it would initially level
the playing field in that the employee, while most often having fewer
resources than the corporation, has better knowledge of the facts
surrounding the adverse action against him. 275 Moreover, the indignant
employee is most likely strongest initially, while the corporate giant has
been taken by surprise. In contrast, the corporate respondent will begin
to investigate once sued, and mount a defense with its vast resources.
As it does so, the corporate employer will grow stronger and the
employee, who is now most likely out of work, and growing financially
and emotionally less strong, will lose morale and the will to fight.
As the proceedings progress, within 60 days of the filing of the
complaint, the investigator is supposed to make a determination on
behalf of the Assistant Secretary that either preliminary relief is

269.
270.

See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
See Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under Section
806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg.
52,104-05 (Aug. 24, 2004) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1980).
271. Id. at 52,106-07.
272. Id. at 52,107.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See supra notes 269-72, infra note 276 and accompanying text.

2007

WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS
UNDER THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

875

warranted, or that the complaint lacks merit. 276 Again, adhering to this
schedule would also benefit the employee, who knows the facts
surrounding his adverse employment action best, and would not allow
the corporate employee to fully gain the advantage of its vast resources.
Adhering to this strict time schedule would also allow the employee to
continue to have income if he were granted relief from the administrator,
including immediate reinstatement as per the regulations. 277 If, on the
other hand, the expeditious proceeding did not result in a favorable
outcome for the employee, he could still demand a hearing before the
Office of Administrative Law Judges. Finally, expeditiously wrapping
up the initial investigative stage of proceedings would allow a hearing to
proceed quickly, also to the general benefit of the employee – and again
leveling what appears to be a very unequal playing field. 278 The
employee would also benefit from the more expeditious proceeding as
the employee likely has few witnesses to prepare, since former coemployees (current employees of the corporation) are not likely to
testify on his behalf, while the employer has many potential witnesses
and must develop a more complicated case for hearing.
B. Make the Employer’s Burden Even More Onerous
As stated above, the employer can beat back the whistleblower’s
claim if it can show clear and convincing evidence of a legitimate reason
for its action against the employee. This is often easy for it to do given
the employer’s access to a cadre of potential “witnesses” within its
current employee ranks. To redress this inequity, employers could be
required to present at least some documentary evidence to support its
276. Preliminary decisions by the Assistant Secretary that are supposed to be made
by the 60-day deadline are not made readily available. 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,108. The
Department of Labor has not, however, consistently made a determination within the
180-day deadline. See U.S. Dept. of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges,
available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov (last visited Apr. 24, 2007) (cataloguing and
digesting cases by date); see also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
277. 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,108. The viability of a preliminary order of reinstatement
has been called into question by the Bechtel decision. Bechtel v. Competitive Techs.,
Inc., 448 F.3d 469, 472-75 (2d Cir. 2006); supra notes 144-45, 147 and accompanying
text.
278. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2) (adopting the rules and procedures set forth in 49
U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)); see also Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination
Complaints, 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,108.
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adverse action and to defend an employee’s case of retaliatory action. I
am not suggesting a statutory change, as it is clear that Congress has not
required “direct” evidence in Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases, nor
has it done so in other discrimination cases. 279 Rather, I am suggesting a
normative shift in perception as to what constitutes “clear and
convincing evidence” in the case of whistleblowing employees under
Sarbanes-Oxley.
This shift in perception, requiring more stringent proof from
employers to meet the “clear and convincing evidence” standard, is
necessary in that the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower is uniquely situated.
The Sarbanes-Oxley complainant may have blown the whistle about
securities fraud and other crimes. Indeed, he may find that he cannot
bear the ultimate burden of persuasion because his immediate past
superior, who might be able to attest to his past good work, is under
investigation or indictment, and is either unwilling or unable to support
the former employee. Moreover, it may be that many of the
whistleblowing employee’s former colleagues participated in the fraud,
are witnesses to the fraud, or are facing criminal or other legal charges in
connection with the alleged fraud.
Indeed, the Sarbanes-Oxley complainant may be cut off from all
contact with his former colleagues, these former colleagues refusing to
get involved either on the advice of counsel, or for fear of “engaging”
with a whistleblower. It will often be difficult for a whistleblower
complainant to convince any of his former co-workers to talk to him or
to testify on his behalf for fear of termination 280 or criminal reprisals. In
at least one case, a whistleblowing employee resorted to the use of an
affidavit from the CEO of a company with which she had had business
dealings to refute the testimony of her direct supervisor. 281 In many
instances, however, it will not be possible for a whistleblower to get an
employee of another company to vouch for him since even the
“outsider” will fear damaging his own relationships with the respondent
employer in the process. Additionally, many lower level personnel
never have contact with anyone outside the company who would be in a
position to vouch for their good work. Yet, these lower level employees
279.
280.

Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2003).
Getman v. Sw. Sec., Inc., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 71, at *68-70 (Feb. 2, 2004),
rev’d on other grounds, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 18 (Jul. 29, 2005).
281. Id. at *69 (noting that complainant beat back claims that she was not a
competent employee with an affidavit of an officer from another company).
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may be the first to witness corporate fraud in a workplace.
The potential criminal ramifications involved in a Sarbanes-Oxley
complaint, the often sweeping investigations that accompany
whistleblower complaints under Sarbanes-Oxley, and corporate
employees’ general unwillingness to take the side of a former employee
whistleblower all make it difficult—if not impossible—for SarbanesOxley whistleblowers to obtain the help of former colleagues. 282
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers, thus by the nature of what they report
on, find themselves in a unique and particularly isolating position vis a
vis other employees of the corporation.
C. Allow Employee-Access to Employer-Submissions
During the OSHA Investigation
An anomaly of the Sarbanes-Oxley procedures allows OSHA to
keep employer submissions from employees during the investigative
stage of the OSHA proceedings. 283 Given the employees’ stature—out
of work, potentially disheartened, and without resources—this is a
critical stage of the proceeding. 284 At this stage, OSHA has a remedy
that was intended to be very powerful: the power to order reinstatement
of the employee. 285 In many cases, the employer may not want the
employee to return to work and an order of reinstatement would be an
enormous boon to an employee wishing to settle a dispute with his
employer. Yet employers are permitted to submit statements to OSHA
during this investigative stage that are not given to the complainant. 286
This unfair aspect of the process should be modified to allow access to
submissions for both parties, as the current system does not further
efforts to get to the true facts of a dispute. 287
282.
283.

See OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 193.
See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,106-07; see also supra notes 34-39 and accompanying

text.
284.
285.

See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,106-07.
But see Bechtel v. Competitive Techs., Inc., 448 F.3d 469, 472-75 (2d Cir.
2006) (questioning the viability of the reinstatement order); supra notes 144-45, 147
and accompanying text. See supra note 68 for a discussion of the Welch case and the
reinstatement order therein.
286. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,106-07; supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
287. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,106-07; supra notes 34-39 and accompanying
discussion. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has said that an airing of factual
concerns, however brief, serves due process in the proper context and may avoid
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D. Corporate Culture
Corporations must educate employees about corporate compliance
issues, and make clear to them that they have a new role in corporate
America as “foot soldiers” in the battle against corporate fraud and
corporations. 288 Public corporations need to do more to make their
employees aware of anonymous reporting hotlines, and make sure those
They must
hotlines connect to outside independent persons. 289
encourage employees, even those at non-managerial levels, to raise
serious questions with their supervisors or, if the situation requires it,
with the independent board of directors. Reporting potential violations
in house—even to executive management—may not be sufficient, where
executive management may be involved in the fraud. 290 The difficulty
of course is that there may be occasions where a non-managerial
employee may not even know he has come upon corporate irregularity
or fraud, let alone whether to report these findings to his boss or a higher
authority, who may end up being involved. 291 The best way to solve this
problem is to encourage open communication throughout the
organization, and to have a reporting line directly to the outside board of
directors or outside counsel.
CONCLUSION
When it passed Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress intended to protect
whistleblowers once they had blown the whistle. Past cases demonstrate
that whistleblowers have been largely unsuccessful when challenging
erroneous determinations. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-68 (1970).
288. Mechanisms for reporting potential violations should be well publicized.
Teresa T. Kennedy et al., About That Compliance Thing . . . Creating and Evaluating
Effective Compliance Programs, 28 (2004) available at http://www.kpmginsights.com/
pdf/compliancething.pdf.
289. Id. at 40.
290. L. Dennis Kozlowski, former chairman and chief executive of Tyco
International was, for example, indicted and convicted of larceny and conspiracy. See,
e.g., Andy Wickstrom, Last Straw, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2006, at C2. To whom would
a lower level employee at Tyco have safely reported if he had had evidence of the
crimes committed at Tyco before the government had such information?
291. See Damon Darlin & Miquel Helft, H.P. Before a Skeptical Congress, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2006, at C1 (questioning top executives in possible criminal fraud at
Hewlett-Packard).
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their employer’s adverse actions against them. The implementing
regulations under the Act need to be followed more closely and courts
need to carefully scrutinize an employer’s asserted legitimate reasons for
acting against a whistleblowing employee. Until these modest but
effective changes in the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower provisions are made, and corporate culture more widely
embraces open communication, whistleblowers will not be willing to
blow the whistle in America. This is a great loss, as after all, it is those
who work in the corporations every day that first bear witness to the
transgressions that so often culminate in massive corporate fraud.

